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Abstract
The adverse effects of financial crises in terms of output losses
or output growth below its potential can be treated like losses from
catastrophic events which have a low likelihood but a large impact in
the event that they occur.
We therefore analyze GDP losses in terms of frequency (number
of loss events per period) and severity (loss per occurrence). Crises’
frequency, severity, and the associated global output losses over pe-
riods of five years are identified on the basis of Laeven and Valencia
(2008). Applying the Loss Distribution Approach used in insurance
and operational risk theory and practice, we estimate a multi-country
aggregate GDP loss distribution and thus approximate the conditional
losses in the event of financial crises.
The analysis of losses produced in the paper suggests that the LDA
approach is a useful tool in discussions about the existence and capital
requirements of a potential insurance against the risk of financial crises
at the aggregate level.
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1 Introduction
Financial crises have played a quintessential role after the collapse of the Bret-
ton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Episodes like the Latin American
debt crises in the 80’s, the 1987 Black Monday, the 1992-1993 ERM crisis,
the 1994-1995 Tequila crisis, the 1997-1998 South East Asian meltdown, the
1998-1999 Brazilian and Russian crisis, the 2000-2001 Turkish crisis, the 2001
Argentine crisis and the 2007-2009 global financial crisis all resemble disaster
events, just like hurricanes or earthquakes.
Like catastrophic events, financial crises can be characterized by frequency
and severity. In fact, analysis made in the financial crises literature often re-
fer to terms such as frequency and/or severity (see e.g. Bordo et al. (2001)).
The insurance and operational risk theory and practice offer toolkits to ana-
lyze frequency and severity of losses as well as aggregate losses due to catas-
trophic or operational risk events. Given that the losses to country economies
from financial crises (in terms of GDP drop or forgone GDP) are similar to
operational risk losses, we can apply the loss distribution approach1 (LDA)
common in the actuarial literature to analyze frequency and severity of losses
and thus study rare events and their probabilities. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no attempt to quantify the frequency and severity of financial
crises using the LDA.
The LDA allows us to estimate a multi-country aggregate GDP loss distri-
bution and thus estimate conditional losses in the event of a financial crisis
occurring in the near future. We can also determine the probability of rare
economic disasters as defined for example in Barro (2006) for example. In
contrast to Barro (2006) however, we do not make any assumptions on the
channel through which crises occur (e.g. catastrophic events like earthquakes
or regular/cyclical disaster events).
In terms of methodology, we first use the financial crises database of Laeven
and Valencia (2008) to date financial crises across 170 countries from 1970
onwards. The number of such events over a predetermined period is called
the frequency of events. We then estimate specific country output losses per
event with a number of methods. Afterwards, we aggregate the losses over
the countries in the sample. Those aggregate losses are the severity of each
event. Since a particular crisis event can generate output losses over various
years, we set the minimum span of analysis to be five years. Finally, we
compound frequency and severity to generate a loss distribution of aggregate
1See Panger (2006); Shevchenko (2011) for definitions.
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losses that will allow us to report standard risk measures.
The analysis of losses produced in the paper can be a useful tool in discussions
about the existence of insurance against the risk of financial crises at the
aggregate level. For example, Caballero (2003) proposes such an arrangement
for emerging market economies.
In what follows, we will provide a short literature review and discuss the
possibilities at hand to calculate output costs of financial crises. In section
3, we introduce the methodology of crisis identification and loss calculation,
while the Loss Distribution Approach is explained in Section 4. Results are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses a potential form of international
insurance and Section 7 concludes.
2 The costs of financial crises
In order to quantify the costs of financial crises, a cost measure must be
established. This task has been approached in different manners by vari-
ous authors. Costs have been estimated as fiscal costs, costs to the stock
market, and output costs. Amongst authors analyzing the same kinds of
losses, methodologies differ widely. In addition, one of the main obstacles to
measuring losses caused by financial crises is the identification issue.
2.1 Fiscal costs, costs to the stock market and output
losses
In an attempt to quantify the costs of banking crises to the economy, Hog-
garth et al. (2001) consider direct resolution costs as well as broader welfare
costs to the economy, approximated by output losses. They argue that res-
olution costs are a rather limited proxy for costs incurred through banking
crises, as they may reflect a transfer of income from taxpayers to banks rather
than costs imposed to the economy as a whole. The authors reason that there
could be a positive correlation between fiscal costs and output losses if crises
are systemic. On the other hand, if fiscal costs are a good proxy for effective
crisis resolution, higher spending on crisis resolution should lead to lower
output losses during a crisis period. No clear statistical relationship between
fiscal costs and crisis length is found, while output losses and the length of
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crises do depict a clear positive correlation2.
Frydl (1999) presents a comparative analysis of prior banking crisis stud-
ies. As one of the reasons for the non-significant statistical relation between
resolution costs and crisis length, he claims that resolution costs usually mea-
sure fiscal costs of banking crises, which are often subject to various errors
and do not incorporate many indirect costs to the government or economy.
Having dismissed fiscal costs as a reliable indicator for crisis severity, Boyd
et al. (2000), amongst other measures, uses the discounted value of corpo-
rate returns to measure crisis impact. Under the condition that corporate
profits represent a relatively constant fraction of total output, a decline in
the real values of stock prices at the onset of a crisis in percentage terms is
approximately equal to the decline in the present discounted value of total
output.3
With regards to the impact and depth of currency crises, possible measures
to be considered (in addition to output losses) are the loss of international
reserves and the depreciation of the real exchange rate (Kaminsky and Rein-
hart, 2002). The most utilized method, however, is to proxy costs to the
economy with losses in GDP since economic growth is a natural final perfor-
mance indicator.
Two strains of literature approximating real GDP losses after financial crises
can be identified. The first utilizes a dummy variable approach to estimate
growth losses over samples of countries, while the second proxies welfare
losses by comparing GDP during a crisis period with some estimate of po-
tential output. Representatives of the former approach are Demirguc-Kunt
et.al (2006), Gupta et al. (2007), Hanna and Huang (2002) and Barro (2001).
A main criticism of the former approach is that it can only identify average
magnitudes of growth contractions associated with crises for all countries in a
sample. It therefore does not seem to be well suited in the case of crisis losses
being highly heterogeneous. Output costs calculated through cross-section
or panel data regressions are usually found to be lower than losses calculated
based on output gap estimations.
Hoggarth et al. (2001) is one representative study for the latter approach.
2Part of their analysis responds to studies carried out in Demirguc-Kunt and Detra-
giache (1998) and in Caprio et al. (1997), who consider fiscal costs of crisis resolution to
measure the severity of banking crises.
3Focusing on fiscal costs of banking crises, Honohan et al. (2000) use government spend-
ing and costs of rescue policies as shares of GDP as an indicator for output losses. In an
econometric analysis, the authors attempt to model the cross-country variation in fiscal
costs as a function of various policy tools.
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The authors estimate potential output assuming that output would have
grown at the same constant rate based on its past performance. Various
studies, such as Bordo et al. (2001), Aziz et al. (2000), Frydl (1999), Boyd et
al. (2000, 2002) and Cecchetti et al. (2009) calculate output losses from bank-
ing crises in a similar fashion, even though their trend estimates are based
on differing pre-crises windows, methods, definitions about onsets, ends and
durations of crisis episodes4.
In a comparative analysis, Angkinand (2008) suggests that the output devia-
tion technique (or output gap approach) is more appropriate than a dummy
variable approach in capturing the output costs of crises, the main reason
being that individual output costs across crises vary substantially. As output
does take up to ten years before recovering its pre-crisis growth rate (Hog-
garth et al., 2001), and in many cases never returns to potential output level
(Boyd et al., 2002), the output gap approach is judged to be preferable to
the dummy variable endeavor.
2.2 Output gap calculations
Determining the length of a crisis
No unanimously agreed upon method to date the beginning of financial crises
has been established in the literature. Banking crisis start dates are usually
defined through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative criteria. Caprio
et al. (1996) rely on the assessment of finance professionals. Including and
expanding on this approach, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) compile
five studies of banking crises’ starting dates. 5
The onset of a currency crisis is generally defined as a situation where a
sufficiently large devaluation of the domestic currency and/or a loss in in-
ternational reserves6 occurs, while a debt crisis is classified in the event of a
country defaulting or renegotiating on all or parts of its private debt. The
most recent financial crises compilation, widely used in younger empirical
studies on the topic, stems from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and comprises
banking, currency, and debt crises over the period of 1970 to 2008.
4Barro (2001) e.g. estimates growth losses considering growth rates over five year
pre-crises episodes.
5Other studies identifying banking crises’ dates are Dziobek et al. (2008), Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2002), and Lindgren et al. (1996).
6Sometimes an additional criterion of increased speed of depreciation as compared to
some prior time window is introduced.
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In order to date the end of a crisis episode, one possibility is to define the
end date based on “expert” opinions or on the “consensus” view from various
studies. An alternative is to define the end of a crisis endogenously once a
country returns to a certain pre-crisis growth rate or recovers its potential
output growth path.
Studies determining the end of a crisis based on the recovery of the average
growth rate of a pre-crisis window are, amongst others, Bordo et al. (2001)
and Aziz et al. (2000). Authors such as Boyd et al. (2002) argue that sum-
ming up deviations from an estimated trend up to the point at which the
observed growth rate returns to its pre-crisis average is problematic since
output typically remains well below its pre-crisis absolute output trend once
the growth rate has recovered.
Cecchetti et al. (2009) avoid calculating a counterfactual and define the end
of a crisis as the point in time when real GDP has reached its absolute
pre-crisis level. This method is problematic in at least two ways. Firstly,
the method does not take opportunity costs of foregone output growth into
account. Secondly, the method implies that a crisis is only counted as such
if output growth actually turns negative during the crisis year. It can be
argued, however, that a financial crisis has negative effects without having
caused an actual recession, e.g. through a transitory or permanent slowdown
in growth. Moreover, since potential growth rates vary across countries,
dating the end of a recession by reaching its pre-crisis level of real GDP can
lead to an underestimation of total losses incurred.
Estimation of a counterfactual
In order to measure output losses during crisis periods according to some
methods described above, it is necessary to compare actual output with its
trend or potential. Several approaches have been used in the literature and
differ mainly by the pre-crisis time window chosen, which in turn depends
on the assumption about financial crises either following economic booms or
a slowdown in economic activity.
Hoggarth et al. (2001) assume that output would have grown at a constant
rate based on past growth performance and extrapolate linear three- and
ten-year trends, while Bordo et al. (2001) use five-year pre-crises trends to
compute the potential growth path. Frydl (1999) exclusively makes use of a
ten year pre-crisis period to calculate potential output growth. Boyd et al.
(2000) advance in the same manner, extrapolating a linear pre-crisis growth
trend in order to establish a counterfactual. 7
7Due to the need of relatively long time series without gaps, the HP filter is a less
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A large part of the heterogeneity in the magnitude of output losses in the
study of crises stems from the calculation of potential trend output. Several
studies have found that banking crises follow economic booms.8 In this case,
a trend estimated over a short period prior to a crisis would overestimate
potential output and lead to an overestimation of crisis length and depth. On
the other hand, several studies find that banking crises are often preceded by
a slowdown of economic activity,9 in which case losses would be understated.
If one assumes that pre-crisis growth deviates (in either direction) from the
long-term potential output growth path, one option is to increase the pre-
crisis trend calculation period in order to capture mostly “normal” years. An
alternative is to exclude a certain period prior to the onset of a crisis. Lastly,
more sophisticated trend estimations such as the HP Filter method can be
applied to diminish the influence of booms or recessions on the potential
growth path. 10
Once having established the counterfactual, total output losses are estimated
by adding up the difference between actual and potential output over the
duration of the respective crisis.
Even though the general concept is agreed upon across the studies mentioned
above, several methodological issues remain debated. Identification of crises
accompanied by output losses varies among studies. While some authors
include a crisis if output is below its trend or if output growth is negative
during the crisis year, other studies include crises even though output is above
its trend in the crisis year, given that output is below trend in the subsequent
year (Angkinand, 2008). Further issues arise in the case of multiple crises
per country within short periods of time. In the case that output has not yet
recovered from one crisis at the point of outbreak of a following crisis, some
studies choose to sum losses of subsequent crises and report a single loss,
while others divide losses across crises or simply choose to exclude countries
with multiple crises during the sample period.11
applied but attractive technique in order to estimate potential output (Cerra et al., 2000).
8See e.g. Kindleberger (1978), Borio et al. (1996) and Logan (2001). Bicaba, Kapp,
and Molteni (2011) find no evidence for the hypothesis that financial crises are more likely
to occur after periods of strong economic growth but that on the contrary periods of high
growth tend to extend periods of stability between financial crises
9See e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002), Gorton (1998)
10While the IMF (1998) and Aziz et al. (2000) base potential output on the average
output of the three years prior to crises, Bordo et al. (2001) use five-year pre-crisis growth
rates and Hoggarth et al. (2001) calculate potential output trends based on ten-, three-,
and one-year pre-crises growth rates; for a comparative study see Angkinand (2008).
11As Angkinand (2008) points out, most studies estimating output costs of crises mea-
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2.3 Identification of causality
In order to assess the direction of causality between economic growth and
banking crises, Hoggarth et al. (2001) compare a sample of 29 countries
experiencing banking crises with neighboring countries which did not face
banking crises at the same time. The hypothesis is that “the movement in
output relative to trend during the crisis period would have been, in the
absence of a banking crisis, the same or similar to the movement in the
pairing country” (Hoggarth et al., 2001). Their analysis hints at the point
that output losses are in most cases caused by banking crises and come as
unforeseen events.
Bordo et al. (2001) find, across all countries and crisis periods considered,
that recessions with crises are more severe than recessions without them.
These results are in line with various studies such as Frydl (1999).12
3 Methodology
3.1 Crisis identification
We identify financial crises based on Laeven and Valencia (2008). Currency
crises, banking crises, and debt crises are identified over the period 1970
to 2008.13 The number of currency crises peaked during the early eighties
and the early nineties with around 30 currency crises per year, while banking
crises have in general been less frequent and peaked during the early nineties.
The number of debt crises per year has been decreasing since the mid-1980’s
sure the magnitude of growth contractions by adding deviations of the actual GDP growth
rate from its potential, while a number of studies estimate losses by the deviation of the
actual level of GDP from the level of its trend. Examples of the former are Aziz et al.
(2000), Bordo et al. (2001), Hohohan and Klingebiel (2003), Claessens et al. (2004),
and Gupta et al. (2007), while examples of the latter are Hutchinson and McDill (1998),
Hoggarth et al. (2001), and Boyd et al. (2002).
12For potential channels of crisis transmission mechanisms see e.g. Lindgren et al.
(1996), Hoggarth et al. (2001), Stone (2000), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009), Gupta et al. (2007).
13Laeven and Valencia (2008) identify banking crises on the basis of a number of quan-
titative and subjective criteria, such as a large number of defaults and a high quantity of
non-performing loans. The starting year of a currency crisis is identified by building on
an approach developed in Frankel and Rose (1996). Sovereign debt crises are reported in
the case of sovereign defaults to private lending as well as in a year of debt rescheduling.
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and debt crises have nearly ceased to exist until recently. 14
We identify the starting date of a financial crisis as the year of outbreak of
any one of the three types of crises. Real GDP data is taken from the World
Economic Outlook database and spans the time period from 1960 to 2010.
In order to calculate output losses caused by crises, the first step is to define
whether a crisis has had an impact on the economy. In the case where
output is compared to a counterfactual, we identify a crisis if output in
the crisis year is below its potential output trend (potential output trend
calculations are discussed below). In an alternative calculation of crisis losses,
no counterfactual is established and a crisis accompanied by output losses is
considered as such if output growth is negative during the crisis year.
For countries with multiple crises during the sample period it is possible that
a crisis occurs before the economy has recovered from a previous crisis. In
this case, we assign subsequent losses to the later crisis date, establishing a
new counterfactual. This method is problematic, though other alternatives
suffer from larger errors. Allocating output losses from subsequent crises to
the first crisis would largely overstate output losses in various cases.15
3.2 Output losses
We estimate three kinds of potential output trends and propose several cutoff
points to determine the end of a crisis. In short, there is no perfect method
to estimate an objective output trend. Every method presented shows both
advantages and disadvantages depending on the assumptions about the me-
chanics of financial crises development.
Following the literature, we estimate potential GDP after the onset of a
crisis in three ways. We estimate a Hodrick-Prescott Filter trend (HP),
where potential output during a crisis episode is based on the average HP
growth rate of the ten and three year pre-crisis periods. In addition, we use
average growth rates from three year and ten year pre-crisis time windows.
We compare the losses against trend outputs to absolute losses (for episodes
of negative growth) without considering opportunity costs. In total we have
thirteen possible ways to measure output losses as well as their severity and
frequency.
14For a more detailed discussion see Bicaba, Kapp, and Molteni (2011).
15Boyd et al. (2002) exclude countries with multiple crises from their analysis, and
Angkinand (2008) truncates the computation of the output deviations of previous crisis.
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Output losses are calculated as the difference between actual real GDP and
the output trend. As can be seen in Figure 1, depicting output during the
Ecuadorian Banking crisis of 1998, losses depend not only on the definition
of the counterfactual but largely on establishing an end-point to a crisis.
According to the most simple definition of the time span during which crises
losses should be considered, the time output needs to recover its pre-crisis
level of GDP, the effects of the crisis lasted two years and led to an output loss
of 10% of GDP. If crisis length is calculated until real GDP growth reached
its pre-crisis growth rate, output losses occurred over a period of two and
three years and led to output losses of 10.1% and 22.4% of GDP, calculated
against a three- and ten-year pre-crisis growth trend respectively.
Figure 1: Ecuador 1998
Source: Authors’ calculations
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, this calculation most likely still does not account
for the total output loss caused by the 1998 Ecuadorian banking crisis. The
period of output loss increases to six and seven years, and output losses
accumulate to 38.1% and 51.4% of GDP if losses are calculated until the
level of real GDP has recovered its three- and ten-year pre-crisis trend. As
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, output losses seem to be underestimated if
crisis recovery is defined as being completed at the point where the pre-crisis
growth rate or the pre-crisis level of real GDP are recovered.
As mentioned above, we estimate losses using various trends and various cut-
off points to determine the end of a crisis. In total, 13 loss estimations are
10
Figure 2: Ecuador 1998
Source: Authors’ calculations
presented.
We distinguish between three definitions as to when an economy has recov-
ered from a crisis. According to the first definition, a crisis ends once real
output has reached the level of its counterfactual. The alternative is that
recovery is completed once the average pre-crisis growth rate is recovered.
As some countries never recover according to these definitions, accumulated
losses against the counterfactuals based on linear three- and ten year trends,
based on simple averages of pre-crises growth, are considered over maximum
periods of five and ten years, while the losses against trends based on the
HP filter are allowed to accumulate over periods of maximum ten years. In
the absence of a counterfactual, a crisis is supposed to be ended once output
reaches its absolute pre-crisis level of real GDP.
4 Loss Distribution Approach (LDA)
The estimated output losses across countries obtained in the previous section
allow us to study the frequency and severity of losses. In the analysis of a
financial crisis hitting the world economy, two usual questions appear: i)
what is the frequency of financial crisis? and b) given a financial crisis, how
severe is it? The frequency of financial crises is the number of such events
over a specific period of time. Since a financial crisis duration spans generally
more than a year, we choose a five-year reference period. The severity of a
11
financial crisis is the amount of output loss incurred in each crisis episode.
Given the frequency and severity of losses occurring within 5-year periods,
we can use the LDA analysis common in the insurance and operational risks
literature. We estimate two possible parametric distribution functions com-
monly used to describe the frequency of events nt over a period of time t. We
also estimate a set of six severity probability density functions16 for events
zt,i. As opposed to the standard one year period, our t represents periods of
5 years. This is because GDP losses due to financial crises consider losses
over more than one year. The index i tracks each event within the period of
analysis t.
During a 5-year period of time t, total losses are given by the sum of each
loss event i across countries in the sample.
St =
nt∑
i=1
zt,i (1)
The variable nt is by nature a discrete one while the variables zt,i are non-
negative (positive losses). The aggregated loss S depends on the realization
of the discrete random variable (n) and the continuous random variable (zi).
Therefore, the aggregation S is itself a random variable whose distribution
has to be determined by convolution methods (Panger, 2006; Shevchenko,
2011).
Specifically, the frequency of loss events (n) has a probability distribution de-
noted by pn = Pr(N = n) while the loss severity z has a density distribution
and cumulative distribution functions denoted by fz and Fz, respectively. Ac-
cording to (Panger, 2006), the cumulative probability distribution function
of S is defined as:
F (S) = Pr(ω ≤ S)
=
∑∞
n=0 pnPr(ω|N = n)
=
∑∞
n=0 pnF
n
Z (S)
(2)
A simple way to estimate F (s) is via Monte Carlo simulations. First we draw
n from pn and then we draw z from fz as many times as indicated by n and
sum up the z draws.
16The set is composed of the gamma, exponential, generalized extreme value, generalized
pareto, log normal and weibull density functions.
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5 Results
In total, we observe 62 debt crises, 122 banking crises, and 196 currency
crises. As some of these crises in effect form twin crises, a total of 340
crises episodes are examined. Depending on the method applied, between
110 and 219 contractionary crises episodes can be found. While around 210
contractionary crises episodes are identified against HP trends, only 110 crises
were accompanied by negative growth rates during the crisis year.
Average losses are found to be higher than in several past studies, one reason
being that while econometric studies usually estimate losses over a sam-
ple comprising expansionary and recessionary crises, we only consider crises
leading to output losses (against a trend or absolute). From a total of 196
currency crises in our sample, between 90 and 120 crises (depending on the
calculation method applied) can be considered to have led to a loss of output
compared to some measure of potential output, while 63 crises were accompa-
nied by negative output growth. This result is in line with previous studies
such as Gupta et al. (2007), who find that about 60 percent of currency
crises lead to output contractions while the rest were accompanied by output
expansions.
The analysis that follows concentrates on a benchmark loss classification
group that relies on the HP filter: losses until recovering average 10 year
HP filtered GDP growth rates (HP(10)perc), the level of a 10 year HP
filtered GDP trend (HP(10)trend), 3 year HP filtered GDP growth rates
(HP(3)perc), and the level of a 3 year HP filtered GDP trend (HP(3)trend).
5.1 The frequency of financial crisis
In order to carry out the LDA, we first estimate distribution functions for
the frequency of losses from financial crises. We assume two commonly used
distributions. The Poisson and the Negative Binomial Distribution. The
key parameter in the Poisson Distribution is λ which is also the mean and
variance of the data. This is the difficult point for the fit of the Poisson, the
data in our benchmark case (the four HP trend counterfactuals) have number
of crisis events with a variance of about sixteen times the mean.17 Therefore,
17The number of crisis events for the other loss classifications have a variance to mean
ratio of more than 13, except for the case where opportunity costs are not considered
(ABS).
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the two parameter Negative Binomial distribution is a more flexible way to
accommodate our data.
In figure 3 we depict the estimated distributions for our benchmark loss
classification. The Negative Binomial has a lower mode but allows a more
extreme number of losses relative to the Poisson distribution. The probability
that the data comes from the Negative Binomial is higher for all cases (the
benchmark and all types of loss classifications).
Figure 3: Estimated distribution for frequency of losses
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Note: +++: Negative Binomial, ***: Poisson. Horizontal axis measures the number of
financial crisis in the world over a typical five-year period
5.2 Severity
The average accumulated loss caused by financial crises varies from 9% of
real GDP to 15% of real GDP if output losses are accumulated against trends
based on HP filtered data (table 1). In total, depending on the loss measure
applied, 186 to 219 crises episodes can be observed. Average losses are largest
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when calculated against a ten year trend and if losses are considered until
the level of trend output has been recovered over a maximum time span of
10 years.
A “normal” crisis episode, as measured by the median of percentage losses
of initial GDP, leads to losses of 4.9% to 27.7% of GDP across various loss
measures.18 As can be seen in table 7 (Appendix), output losses are very
heterogeneous and large average percentage losses are driven by few especially
severe crises events. Of these most severe events, potential output has not
been reached again within a period of ten years.19 Amongst the largest losses
observed are those of several Asian countries, namely Indonesia in 1998 and
Thailand in 1997, both experiencing severe losses in the wake of the Asian
crisis.
As can be seen in table 7 in the appendix, output losses are larger if a crisis
is considered as overcome once its potential output trend has been recovered.
Median losses lie between 4.9% and 7.15% of initial GDP. The most severe
crises destroy up to three years of economic output20
Table 1: Severity of financial crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Loss Measure Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
HP10 perc 204 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.0001 2.30
HP10 trend 214 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.0003 2.30
HP3 perc 203 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.0000 2.04
HP3 trend 219 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.0000 1.06
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover average 10 year HP filtered GDP growth rates
(HP10 perc), to recover the level of a 10 year HP filtered GDP trend (HP10 trend), to
recover 3 year HP filtered GDP growth rates (HP3 perc), and to recover the level of a 3
year HP filtered GDP trend (HP3 trend)
Severity data due to financial crisis has a key feature, it is extreme valued.
In figure 4 we see that the mean-excess-over-threshold plots21 have positive
slope at the right extreme of losses. Figure 5 shows that the long-tailed
18See table 1 and table 7 (Appendix)
19This result is in line with (Furceri et. al., 2011), who find that the growth rate after
debt crises eight years after the onset is still suppressed be nearly 10 percentage points.
20Crises’ percentage losses are calculated as the sum of the difference between real output
observed and potential output after the onset of a crisis until its end, divided by the real
output in the year of crisis onset. Losses are usually larger if calculated on the basis of
other trend estimations as presented in the appendix.
21The sample mean excess plot is defined by: mep =
∑n
i (Xi−u)I(Xi>u)∑n
i I(Xi>u)
, with u > 0 and
I(.) and indicator function.
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nature of severity data is generated by specific types of crises. Currency and
twin currency-banking crises produce the more extreme type of losses.
Figure 4: Mean excess over threshold for severity data. Both axes are in log
scale
16
We fit the severity data with six possible probability density functions using
the maximum likelihood estimator for the corresponding parameters. The
six distributions are the Gamma, Exponential, Generalized Extreme Value
(GEV), Generalized Pareto, Log-normal, and Weibull. Some distributions,
like the GEV, fit the right end side better, while others have a better fit over
the entire range of data. Our benchmark choice is the Weibull distribution
because it maintains a better fit over the entire range of data for all severity
classifications.
Types of financial crises
Consistent with previous studies, we find that currency crises lead to smaller
output losses than debt and banking crises.22 About 70 of the 122 banking
crises in our sample lead to output losses. It can not be concluded from our
analysis that banking and currency crises are generally preceded by high or
low periods of growth as we do not observe a general dominance of losses
calculated against three year pre-crisis trends as opposed to losses against
ten year pre-crisis trends.
We find that average output losses after debt crises23 are 9% higher than
losses after banking crises. The median debt crisis is accompanied by output
losses of 11.7%, three percentage points larger than the median banking crisis.
A large share of debt crises has, however, been accompanied by banking
crises. Of the 62 debt crises in our sample, 36 have led to periods of negative
growth. Of these 36 episodes, 26 have been accompanied by banking crises
with mean losses about 30% higher than if debt crises occur alone. Currency
crises24 incur smaller losses than banking or debt crises of 15% in the mean
and 5% in the median.25
Banking and debt crises alone are found to be more severe than twin crises
consisting of banking and currency crises or debt and currency crises. While
twin crises between banking or debt and currency crises mostly lead to larger
growth reductions in the very short run than banking or debt crises alone,
long term losses are often found to be smaller. A possible explanation could
22Distributions of these three types of crises’ losses, calculated as losses accrued over a
maximum period of five years until the average growth rate of a ten year pre-crises period
is recovered, are depicted in figure 6, while descriptive statistics of all calculation methods
are provided in tables 8 to 14.
2323% of initial GDP if recovery of the average HP growth rate ten years before a crisis
is considered (HP10 perc)
24according to HP10 perc
25This result is in line with (Furceri et. al., 2011), who using an econometrical approach,
conclude that debt crises tend to be more detrimental than banking and currency crises.
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Figure 5: Severity distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations, For graphical reasons, distributions are cut at 1.5
be that a depreciation in the wake of a twin crisis (including a currency crisis)
allows for a competitiveness gain which is not present when a banking crisis
occurs alone and allows for a faster recovery. Twin crises consisting of debt
and banking crises consequently incur the highest losses in our sample.26
Severity by region
The highest losses after financial crises are experienced in Asia with average
losses ranging from 9.8% to 21.8% of initial GDP27. The second highest losses
are observed in Europe, followed by Latin America and Africa. The highest
frequency of financial crises is ,however, observed for Africa. Europe and
Asia are mostly struck by currency and banking crises, while Africa and
Latin America have suffered from all three types of crises to nearly equal
degrees. In a joint analysis, debt crises were observed to be more severe than
currency or banking crises. This result holds for all regions except for Asia,
where banking crises lead to the most severe losses. Since a high share of
currency and banking crises reported are in effect twin crises, it is however
difficult to disentangle losses from both types separately.28
26For detailed descriptive statistics of other loss measures, please see tables 8 to 14.
27Calculated against counterfactuals based on average HP filtered growth rates
28(Furceri et. al., 2011) confirm our results by controlling for the other types of crises.
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Table 2: Severity of crises by Regions - All crises(Losses as percentage
of initial GDP)
Variable Nr. Africa Nr. Europe Nr. Latin A. Nr. Asia Nr. North A.
HP10 perc 79 0.13 22 0.17 39 0.10 39 0.20 1 0.013
HP10 trend 85 0.13 24 0.18 40 0.12 40 0.22 1 0.013
HP3 perc 78 0.07 24 0.10 41 0.12 36 0.10 1 0.008
HP3 trend 86 0.08 24 0.14 45 0.08 39 0.12 1 0.008
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover a 10 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP10 perc),
to recover the level of the 10 year HP filtered GDP (HP10 trend), to recover a 3 year HP
filtered GDP growth (HP3 perc) and to recover the level of the 3 year HP filtered GDP
(HP3 trend)
Severity by Income Groups
In order to compare losses across different income groups, we classify coun-
tries into low, middle, and high income categories.29 On average, middle
income countries experience the highest output losses (15%), followed by
high and low income countries ( 12% and 11% of initial GDP respectively,
see table 3). This observation holds for currency and banking crises, while
losses from debt crises are almost exclusively observed for low and middle
income countries.
The median crisis is more severe in high income than middle income countries.
High average losses in middle income countries are driven by some severe
crisis events, such as Thailand in 1998, experiencing losses of 229%.30 The
median loss is 9% for high income countries, 7% for middle income countries,
and 4% for low income countries. In total, middle income countries suffer
more from financial crises than high income countries as they experience a
larger number of crises per country over the period observed.
Table 3: Severity by income groups(as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Nr. High Income Nr. Middle Income Nr. Low Income
HP10 perc 21 0.13 122 0.18 61 0.11
HP10 trend 22 0.16 128 0.17 64 0.12
HP3 perc 22 0.07 120 0.11 61 0.07
HP3 trend 23 0.09 128 0.11 68 0.07
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover a 10 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP10 perc),
to recover the level of the 10 year HP filtered GDP (HP10 trend), to recover a 3 year HP
filtered GDP growth (HP3 perc) and to recover the level of the 3 year HP filtered GDP
(HP3 trend)
29World Bank classification
30See figure 9, Appendix
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Severity of financial crises over time
As expected, financial crises were especially harmful during the 1990’s and
depict the lowest losses during the 1970’s and the period after the year 2000.
This does however not necessarily mean, however, that financial crises have
become smaller in magnitude. The impact of the latest global financial crisis
cannot yet be compared to previous crises with our methodology.
Table 4: Severity over time - All crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Period HP10 perc HP10trend HP3 perc HP3 trend
1970 -75 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06
1975 -80 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.09
1980 -85 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.10
1985 -90 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.07
1990 -95 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.12
1995 -00 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.07
2000 -05 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.07
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover a 10 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP10 perc),
to recover the level of the 10 year HP filtered GDP (HP10 trend), to recover a 3 year HP
filtered GDP growth (HP3 perc) and to recover the level of the 3 year HP filtered GDP
(HP3 trend)
5.3 The distribution of total losses
Given our choice of the frequency distribution and the severity probability
density function, we perform Monte Carlo simulations to obtain a numerical
probability density function (PDF) of total losses over five years. These
PDF’s are markedly skewed to the right. Table 5 summarizes the results.
The 99.9 percentile of the total loss distribution ranges from 390 to 540
trillions of 2005 USD. These losses might however be too extreme. A closer
figure is the 99 percentile, which is compatible with financial crisis events
occurring every hundred years (190 to 240 USD trillions).
The median cumulative loss ranges from 10 to 15 trillion (in 2005 USD).
This figure is higher than, for example, the cumulative losses due to the
2008 financial crisis, estimated to be roughly 5 trillions (in current USD) in
IMF (2009). Regarding this crisis, Chinn and Frieden (2011) estimate a
cumulative GDP loss for only the USA alone to be about 3.5 trillions in 2005
USD.
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Table 5: Features of the PDF of total losses.
HP10perc HP10trend HP3perc HP3trend
99.9 percentile 4.4e+014 5.4e+014 3.9e+014 4.5e+014
99 percentile 1.9e+014 2.4e+014 1.7e+014 1.9e+014
median 1.3e+013 1.5e+013 1.0e+013 1.3e+013
mean 2.6e+013 3.3e+013 2.2e+013 2.6e+013
Std deviaiton 4.3e+013 5.4e+013 3.8e+013 4.4e+013
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a Weibull
(2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to five-year periods
6 Financial crises insurance
Can output losses from financial crises be diminished or crises prevented ex
ante through an insurance scheme? As financial crises are relatively rare
events, one could imagine countries paying a certain amount during finan-
cially stable times and in return having access to these funds during times
of need.
As financial crises are not comparable to natural disaster events in terms of
causality, a moral hazard problem arises. It has to be assured that access to
an insurance does not lead to lax government spending nor defer reforms.
The potential worldwide costs from financial crises over periods of 5 years
in percentage terms of 2005 World GDP are presented in table 6. Average
costs of financial crises during a period a five years are relatively small and
amount to less than one percent of 2005 World GDP. A period of extreme
crisis events, occurring with a probability of one percent, produces output
costs of up to 5.5% of World GDP.
Many of the debt crises included in the above calculations are in fact destabi-
lizing confidence crises or liquidity crises, during which rollover costs of debt
become too high. In a similar manner, liquidity risk is often the cause for
the occurrence of banking crises. The IMF provides a de facto interest rate
insurance31 for these cases in the form of standard IMF programs.
As one type of national insurance against currency crises, nearly all emerging
economies have accumulated large amounts of international reserves in order
31See e.g. Cordella and Yeyati (2005a)
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Table 6: LDA, Losses in constant 2005 USD, over periods of five
years, as percentage of 2005 World GDP
HP10perc HP10trend HP3perc HP3trend
99.9% perctl 9.9% 12.6% 8.8% 10.4%
99 % perctl 4.4% 5.5% 3.8% 4.5%
Median 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
Mean 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.6%
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a Weibull
to possess a buffer against pro-cyclical international capital flows. Caballero
(2003) argues that hedging the financial mechanism behind macroeconomic
disasters is a problem of a magnitude larger than a single market can handle.
Various authors have therefore already proposed an international “insurance”
scheme, under which countries could have access to funds under certain cir-
cumstances.32
The moral hazard problem arising through a potential insurance scheme is
addressed in various studies. Cordella and Yeyati (2005b) examines to what
degree the presence of a country insurance scheme affects the policymakers’
incentives to undertake reforms. An important channel through which insur-
ance can foster reforms can be identified: Insurance reduces the probability
that deteriorating fundamentals evolve into large crises, which may enhance
the expected political reforms and increase reform incentives.
Participation in a potential crisis insurance fund would therefore have to be
subject to ex ante compliance with a number of clearly defined eligibility
criteria, such as low budget deficits and a clear debt to GDP threshold. The
potential insurance coverage must be forfeited as soon as the country does
not fulfill all criteria. As stated in Cordella and Yeyati (2005a), it would
also be crucial to characterize and standardize the procedures followed after
funds from the insurance facility have been accessed. In the optimal case,
the existence of this insurance would incite fiscal discipline and, at the same
time, provide liquidity if needed which in turn would lead to fewer crises.
32The IMF is usually proposed to act as an insurance facility, see e.g. Cordella and
Yeyati (2005a), Cordella and Yeyati (2005b) or Caballero (2003).
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7 Conclusion
Having used the financial crises database of Laeven and Valencia (2008)
to date financial crises, we have characterized the heterogeneity of output
losses thereafter under a number of methods. The number of such events
over a certain period has been analyzed as the frequency of events, while the
aggregate losses served to estimate the severity. Finally, we have compounded
frequency and severity in order to generate loss distributions and reported
standard risk measures, fitting both the severity as well as the frequency data
with various possible probability density functions.
In line with the existing literature, we found that output losses after financial
crises are strongly heterogeneous and a large number of countries never re-
covered their pre-crises growth rates or trends. Loss distributions have shown
to be skewed to the right, with average losses ranging between 9% and 15%
of initial GDP.
We show that currency crises lead to smaller output losses than debt and
banking crises, while the largest losses are found after debt crises. The pres-
ence of a debt crisis also exacerbates any of the other two forms of crises,
while the presence of a currency crisis in the wake of a debt or banking crisis
diminishes output losses through faster recovery. Banking and debt crises
alone are found to be more severe than twin crises consisting of banking and
currency crises or debt and currency crises.
We compared output costs from financial crises over regions, income groups,
and time, finding that Asia has suffered from the most severe financial crises,
while Africa experiences the highest frequency of financial crises. Congru-
ently, middle income countries experience the highest output losses, followed
by high and low income countries. Financial crises are observed to have been
especially harmful during the 1990’s, while an assessment of the severity of
the recent 2008 financial crisis cannot yet be undertaken with our approach.
The LDA approach leads us to conclude that mean worldwide costs of fi-
nancial crises within periods of 5 years are in the range of 0.5% to 0.7% of
2005 World GDP. Extreme crises episodes, occurring with a probability of
one percent, can lead to losses in the range of 3.8% to 5.5% of world GDP.
The possibility to calculate potential losses from financial crises leads us to
propose an international insurance scheme in the case of financial crises which
in the optimal case would incite fiscal discipline and at the same time provide
liquidity if needed, in turn leading to fewer crises.
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8 Appendix
Figure 6: Guyana 1982
33Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 7: Guyana 1982
34Source: Authors’ calculations
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Figure 8: Percentage loss distributions, Currency, debt, and banking crises
35Source: Authors’ calculations; Distributions are cut at 100 percent
Figure 9: Percentage loss distributions over income groups
36Source: Authors’ calculations
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Figure 10: Percentage loss distributions over regions
37Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 11: Percentage loss distributions over time
38Source: Authors’ calculations, Cut at 100 percent
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Table 7: Losses after financial crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Loss Measure Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 186 0.3241 0.1632 0.4358 0.0005 2.7310
AG(10)(5)trend 186 0.4257 0.2417 0.5217 0.0005 3.6159
AG(3)(5)perc 182 0.3249 0.1696 0.3997 0.0000 2.0615
AG(3)(5)trend 186 0.4567 0.2776 0.5667 0.0000 4.4838
ABS 110 0.8509 0.1111 2.2077 0.0000 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 186 0.5441 0.1632 1.1689 0.0005 8.2695
AG(10)(10)trend 186 1.0587 0.2604 1.9302 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 180 0.5809 0.1732 1.2679 0.0000 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 181 0.9878 0.3403 1.6139 0.0000 9.2046
Table 8: Losses after currency crisis(as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 101 0.2794 0.3949 0.0006 1.8448
AG(10)(5)trend 101 0.3702 0.4870 0.0006 2.2125
AG(3)(5)perc 94 0.2861 0.3658 0.0000 1.7087
AG(3)(5)trend 94 0.3874 0.4260 0.0000 1.7598
HP(10)perc 118 0.1352 0.2825 0.0001 2.2993
HP(10)trend 122 0.1563 0.2947 0.0003 2.2993
HP(3)perc 114 0.0918 0.2111 0.0013 2.0370
HP(3)trend 125 0.0904 0.1293 0.0013 1.0627
ABS 61 0.6811 1.4726 0.0001 7.0657
AG(10)(10)perc 101 0.3674 0.7658 0.0006 6.2588
AG(10)(10)trend 101 0.8587 1.8207 0.0006 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 94 0.3635 0.7025 0.0000 5.4637
AG(3)(10)trend 94 0.8509 1.4290 0.0000 8.3445
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Table 9: Losses after banking crisis(as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 69 0.3650 0.4636 0.0033 2.7310
AG(10)(5)trend 69 0.4834 0.5726 0.0033 3.6159
AG(3)(5)perc 71 0.3321 0.3925 0.0049 2.0615
AG(3)(5)trend 71 0.4793 0.6519 0.0049 4.4838
HP(10)perc 66 0.1424 0.1914 0.0014 1.2766
HP(10)trend 71 0.1547 0.2084 0.0014 1.3075
HP(3)perc 70 0.0800 0.0763 0.0000 0.4705
HP(3)trend 74 0.0958 0.1075 0.0000 0.7574
ABS 35 0.7631 2.1609 0.0000 12.5942
AG(10)(10)perc 69 0.7637 1.5744 0.0033 8.2695
AG(10)(10)trend 69 1.5239 2.4667 0.0033 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 69 0.7888 1.7237 0.0049 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 70 1.7113 4.7780 0.0049 9.2046
Table 10: Losses after debt crisis(as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 39 0.5002 0.4842 0.0005 1.6946
AG(10)(5)trend 39 0.6244 0.4797 0.0005 1.6946
AG(3)(5)perc 39 0.4282 0.4024 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 39 0.5248 0.4477 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 46 0.1723 0.1413 0.0211 0.5531
HP(10)trend 47 0.1966 0.1597 0.0058 0.7095
HP(3)perc 43 0.1224 0.1079 0.0089 0.4846
HP(3)trend 45 0.1395 0.1108 0.0025 0.4846
ABS 36 0.8658 2.7270 0.0026 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 39 1.6642 0.8180 0.0005 4.0388
AG(10)(10)trend 39 1.8217 2.8550 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 39 0.6273 0.9522 0.0005 4.6050
AG(3)(10)trend 39 1.1286 1.4862 0.0005 5.7084
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Table 11: Twin crises - Currency and Debt(as percentage of initial
GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 56 0.3983 0.4209 0.0005 1.8448
AG(10)(5)trend 56 0.5286 0.5121 0.0005 2.2125
AG(3)(5)perc 52 0.3849 0.4200 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 52 0.5198 0.4797 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 64 0.1334 0.1223 0.0018 0.5170
HP(10)trend 67 0.1561 0.1520 0.0018 0.7095
HP(3)perc 66 0.1172 0.2541 0.0023 2.0370
HP(3)trend 71 0.1032 0.0998 0.0023 0.4846
ABS 42 0.5397 1.2529 0.0026 7.0657
AG(10)(10)perc 56 0.5708 0.9698 0.0005 6.2588
AG(10)(10)trend 56 1.4029 2.5465 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 52 0.5311 0.9354 0.0005 5.4637
AG(3)(10)trend 52 1.0760 1.3452 0.0005 4.7534
Table 12: Twin crises - Currency and Banking(as percentage of initial
GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 78 0.2716 0.3726 0.0005 1.6946
AG(10)(5)trend 78 0.3435 0.4417 0.0005 1.6946
AG(3)(5)perc 73 0.2965 0.3360 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 73 0.3900 0.3884 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 101 0.1531 0.3014 0.0018 2.2993
HP(10)trend 103 0.1716 0.3123 0.0018 2.2993
HP(3)perc 95 0.0822 0.1108 0.0013 0.8544
HP(3)trend 103 0.0960 0.1342 0.0013 1.0627
ABS 56 0.6501 1.3273 0.0001 6.8260
AG(10)(10)perc 78 0.3051 0.4492 0.0005 2.1887
AG(10)(10)trend 78 0.8651 2.1069 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 73 0.3492 0.5440 0.0005 3.7145
AG(3)(10)trend 73 0.7216 1.1281 0.0005 5.7125
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Table 13: Twin crises - Debt and Banking(as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 36 0.5213 0.5045 0.0005 1.6946
AG(10)(5)trend 36 0.6631 0.4996 0.0005 1.6946
AG(3)(5)perc 35 0.4247 0.3862 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 35 0.5553 0.4129 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 32 0.2396 0.2447 0.0093 1.2766
HP(10)trend 34 0.2586 0.2595 0.0058 1.3075
HP(3)perc 32 0.1510 0.1293 0.0000 0.4846
HP(3)trend 33 0.1782 0.1590 0.0000 0.7574
ABS 26 1.1814 3.1728 0.0059 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 36 0.7952 1.1590 0.0005 5.4650
AG(10)(10)trend 36 1.7638 2.6372 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 34 0.8204 1.7036 0.0005 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 35 1.3295 1.9641 0.0005 9.2046
Table 14: All Twin Crisis(as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 114 0.3173 0.4052 0.0005 1.8448
AG(10)(5)trend 114 0.4238 0.4946 0.0005 2.2125
AG(3)(5)perc 105 0.3344 0.3755 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 105 0.4527 0.4386 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 130 0.1588 0.2902 0.0018 2.2993
HP(10)trend 136 0.1759 0.2996 0.0018 2.2993
HP(3)perc 126 0.1068 0.2071 0.0000 2.0370
HP(3)trend 136 0.1078 0.1423 0.0000 1.0627
ABS 78 0.9035 2.2318 0.0001 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 114 0.4741 0.9509 0.0005 6.2588
AG(10)(10)trend 114 0.9907 2.0026 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 104 0.5286 1.1851 0.0005 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 105 0.9816 1.5407 0.0005 9.2046
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Table 15: Severity of crises by Regions - All crises (Losses as percentage
of initial GDP)
Variable Nr. Africa Nr. Europe Nr. Latin A. Nr. Asia Nr. North A.
AG(10)(5)perc 71 0.2481 21 0.4674 37 0.2759 32 0.5112 1 0.0091
AG(10)(5)trend 71 0.3253 21 0.6047 37 0.3909 32 0.5751 1 0.0091
AG(3)(5)perc 62 0.2309 26 0.4075 35 0.3083 32 0.5131 1 0.0390
AG(3)(5)trend 62 0.3080 26 0.5250 35 0.4170 32 0.6949 1 0.0390
ABS 43 0.7816 17 1.2325 21 0.3113 14 1.4106 0 0
AG(10)(10)perc 71 0.4279 21 0.5354 37 0.3072 32 1.0558 1 0.0091
AG(10)(10)trend 71 0.9220 21 1.0626 37 0.7603 32 1.8413 1 0.0091
AG(3)(10)perc 60 0.3427 26 0.5793 35 0.3789 32 1.1557 1 0.0390
AG(3)(10)trend 61 0.6376 26 1.2732 35 0.6525 32 1.6113 1 0.0390
Table 16: Average severity of crises by income groups (percentage of
initial GDP)
Variable Nr. High Income Nr. Middle Income Nr. Low Income
AG(10)(5)perc 21 0.2844 112 0.3801 53 0.2215
AG(10)(5)trend 21 0.3901 112 0.4945 53 0.2946
AG(3)(5)perc 21 0.2389 113 0.3800 48 0.2327
AG(3)(5)trend 21 0.4923 113 0.4915 48 0.2890
ABS 10 0.4446 71 0.7927 29 1.1332
AG(10)(10)perc 21 0.4032 112 0.6669 53 0.3403
AG(10)(10)trend 21 1.0673 112 1.1918 53 0.7740
AG(3)(10)perc 21 0.4258 112 0.6814 47 0.4106
AG(3)(10)trend 21 1.1015 113 1.0663 47 0.7485
Table 17: Features of the PDF of total losses (more cases)
ABS AG10.10perc AG10.10trend AG3.10perc AG3.10trend
99.9 percentile 5.0e+014 2.8e+015 5.5e+015 5.1e+015 1.1e+016
99 percentile 2.1e+014 1.1e+015 2.1e+015 1.8e+015 3.9e+015
median 1.1e+013 4.4e+013 8.1e+013 6.6e+013 1.3e+014
mean 2.5e+013 1.2e+014 2.2e+014 1.9e+014 4.0e+014
Std. deviation 4.7e+013 2.6e+014 5.1e+014 4.3e+014 9.9e+014
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a Weibull
(2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to five-year periods
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Table 18: Features of the PDF of total losses (more cases)
AG10.5perc AG10.5trend AG3.5perc AG3.5trend
99.9 percentile 1.5e+015 1.9e+015 2.3e+015 3.6e+015
99 percentile 5.9e+014 7.7e+014 8.6e+014 1.4e+015
median 2.9e+013 3.8e+013 3.9e+013 5.8e+013
mean 7.1e+013 9.3e+013 9.9e+013 1.5e+014
Std. deviation 1.4e+014 1.8e+014 2.1e+014 3.2e+014
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a Weibull
(2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to five-year periods
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